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To the Edge of the 
Urban Landscape: 
Homelessness and  
the Politics of Care
Bart van Leeuwen1
Abstract
Homelessness is an obvious moral challenge, given the fact that it is a problem 
that millions of people in the developed world have to deal with on a daily 
basis. In the relatively scarce literature on this subject, there appear to be—
roughly—three main approaches, namely, what I will refer to as the “difference 
approach,” the “liberal approach” and the “care approach.” In the paper I will 
critically review these three moral perspectives on the issue of homelessness. 
I will argue that the difference approach and the liberal approach in the end are 
unconvincing. Homelessness can hardly be interpreted in terms of an internally 
valued group identity nor in terms of autonomy and its preconditions. I will 
defend a version of the care approach instead, an approach that focuses on the 
concrete and particular needs of the homeless.
Keywords
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Both the rich and the poor have the freedom to sleep on the streets at night, 
but the rich fail to take advantage of this freedom. This jest conveys an obvi-
ous but painful message: the privileged simply do not have to live and sleep 
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on the streets. Homelessness is a problem that millions of people in the devel-
oped world have to deal with on a daily basis.1 I will specifically reflect on 
the problem of homelessness as it occurs in the major cities of the relatively 
rich welfare states of the West. This focus brings out a certain contradiction 
that, I think, is quite puzzling: why do the richest countries in the world have 
millions of people living far below its own basic standards of minimum wel-
fare? Moreover, how is it possible that our liberal-democratic states contain 
citizens that live without the defining characteristic of liberalism itself, 
namely, a private sphere?
One answer to these questions is that most citizens have become so used 
to the sight of the homeless in the centers of our cities that they simply have 
become invisible or are just perceived as part of the normal city-scape.2 
Another possible answer is that most urbanites live in the suburbs anyway, 
where they are not confronted with the evidence of homelessness on a day-
to-day basis.3 These answers, of course, are not satisfactory from the moral 
point of view. But what is the moral point of view regarding homelessness?
In the relatively scarce literature on this subject, there appear to be—
roughly—three main approaches, namely, what I will refer to as the “differ-
ence approach,” the “liberal approach” and the “care approach.” In the essay 
I will critically review these three moral perspectives on the issue of home-
lessness and I will argue that the difference approach and the liberal approach 
in the end are unconvincing and hence unhelpful. Both a politics of pluralism 
(§ 1) and of liberal respect (§ 2) seem not to confront the central moral chal-
lenges of homelessness. In most cases homelessness is neither an internally 
valued group identity nor an authentic choice, but instead a tragic condition 
that is the result of different causes, both structural (e.g., political-economi-
cal) and individual (e.g., addiction, mental illness, unemployment, traumatic 
life histories). For that reason I will defend a version of the care approach, an 
approach that focuses on the concrete and particular needs of the homeless (§ 
3). According to some, however, practices of care and reintegration run the 
risk of a degrading construal of the homeless as “helpless victims” or “clients 
with pathologies”4 at the mercy of a panoptic regime of normalization and 
objectification.5 These worries need to be addressed (§ 4).
1. The Difference Approach to Homelessness
The difference approach to homelessness argues for a more diverse concep-
tion of public space, particularly in terms of a more accommodating system 
of laws and policies of what is allowed on the city streets. These theorists 
basically argue that the homeless have increasingly become victims of 
homogenizing conceptions of public space.6 Increasingly, the public places 
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of the urban landscape are becoming inhospitable to a human life form that is 
considered to be inappropriate and disturbing. Practices like sleeping in pub-
lic, urinating in public parks or alleys and panhandling are increasingly 
banned by local governments. Hence they argue for an acceptance of these 
practices and criticize an increasingly hostile political and juridical system in 
many urban centers, that bans all or some of these activities by means of a 
whole range of anti-homeless policies, such as panhandling and urban camp-
ing ordinances, criminalizing public sleeping, eviction of shelters from gen-
trifying neighborhoods and street sweeps that confiscate the property of 
homeless persons.
The homeless have a “right to ‘live’ in public spaces, a right that out-
weighs the interests others have in not being physically or morally offended.”7 
So what, for instance, should be allowed in the name of a more inclusive 
conception of citizenship are homeless encampments8 and tent cities.9 We 
should in this regard cultivate a cosmopolitan “openness to the Other” instead 
of “demands for assimilation”: “the Other should be allowed to exist as 
Other,” and so we need a politics of “acceptance of heterogeneity.”10 Very 
unhappy parallels are sometimes drawn with immigrants and refugees. All 
these categories more or less collapse into the central concept of “the Other” 
who is on the receiving end of “prerogative power” that is “punitive and dis-
ciplinary.”11 Some pluralists like Smith even argue that the moral point is to 
“accept [homelessness] as a viable lifestyle” and that we “should seek to help 
the homeless to thrive while homeless.”12 Smith defends homelessness 
against prevailing socio-economic norms, such as the work ethic and family 
life. Homeless people “are particularly well situated to discover new path-
ways to spiritual progress,” they embody “the advantages of living more sim-
ply” and a “life advancing strength.”13
Albeit these theorists sometimes use the vocabulary of a politics of recog-
nition or difference, amongst others by criticizing attempts to “assimilate” 
the “other” to a standard of normalcy, the moral logic of a recognition of 
ethnocultural difference is very different. That kind of recognition crucially 
relies on the fact that the relevant difference consists of a valued set of prac-
tices or traditions, that is, valued from the internal point of view by the 
minority group involved. What is key to the moral logic of that kind of rec-
ognition is that the groups who are recognized positively identify with these 
practices or traditions, that is, with their “difference.”14
The problem with a difference approach is that it tries to accommodate a 
mode of existence that typically fails to satisfy basic notions of human dig-
nity and basic need fulfillment. That is why it offends against our moral intu-
itions to suggest that most homeless people positively identify with their 
homeless status and all the activities that they have to perform in public like 
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urinating, panhandling, eating and sleeping. To be homeless is to be caught in 
public, even for the most intimate functions and activities, as well as being 
exposed to the elements. And although most cities have shelter systems in 
place, many homeless avoid them (except in extreme circumstances) because 
they are heavily regulated and offer no (or insufficient) privacy. Moreover, 
homeless people are worried about their safety and health in shelters.15
Part of their misery can be attributed to the fact that they are seen as violat-
ing social norms and offending public sensibilities: they tend to suffer from 
stigma.16 Although the homeless are trapped in public, at the same time they 
are not considered to be part of the public. Besides their outcast status, the 
homeless are effectively noncitizens in the sense in which they are unable to 
meaningfully participate in any civic or social function. In that sense, the 
homeless person is not only without a private sphere but effectively also 
without a public sphere. Various forms of harassment and violence are an 
effect of that nonacceptance.
But even if they were “accepted,” as the difference approach argues for, 
and violence and stigma were brought to an end, there are other grave costs 
to being homeless. More than one-third of the homeless are in poor health 
and their mortality rates are three to four times greater than those of the popu-
lation at large.17 Alcohol and drug abuse is very frequent, partly as a conse-
quence of their destitute situation.18 Among street youth there is a high rate of 
unplanned pregnancy and HIV infection19 and they are more likely to be 
socially isolated20 and to attempt suicide.21
Even if one tries to re-describe a recognition of difference in a moral lan-
guage that seems more fitting, namely, tolerance, the same problem reap-
pears. The difference between recognizing difference and tolerating it is that 
the acceptance of the relevant social difference is accompanied by an objec-
tion to it. Key to the general concept of tolerance is a simultaneous objection 
and acceptance, where the acceptance component in the end trumps the 
objection component in the relevant context.22 However, part of this logic is 
also that the party that performs tolerated acts or practices values these prac-
tices. The idea of toleration does not make much moral sense if the tolerated 
practice, despite objections to it by the tolerating (often more powerful) party, 
is objected to as well by the party that is tolerated with respect to this 
practice.
In short, what is fundamentally problematic about the difference approach 
is that one recognizes social diversity (or that one tolerates it), but that the 
social difference in case is generally not valued by the party that is supposed 
to be the beneficiary of this type of recognition. Voluntary homeless, how-
ever, cannot be ruled out altogether. There is a lure of the open road that some 
people find appealing, at least during certain stages of their life. An example 
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are the so called New Age Travelers, groups of young people who travelled 
around the United Kingdom in caravans or occupied and squatted abandoned 
buildings.23 And some homeless define their hostel room or set of relation-
ships within the homeless or traveling community as “home.”24 For these so 
called “homeless at heart,” who find it difficult to feel part of and function in 
mainstream society and for whom life on the margins has a special allure,25 
we might adopt an attitude of tolerance and accommodation. For this group—
small in reality as it may be—in principle society should allow “disrespectful 
lodging” and “substandard resources” within the limits of mutual respect and 
the risk of serious self-harm.26 However, it is both morally and empirically 
unsupportable that voluntary homelessness is a widespread phenomenon, or 
that it comes even remotely close to being representative of a majority of 
homeless cases. As we have said, basic interests like shelter for the elements, 
safety, privacy, health and food are substantially jeopardized. As Gaetz and 
others put it, “Most people do not choose to be homeless, and the experience 
is generally negative, unpleasant, stressful and distressing.”27
So we are left with a horrible condition, not just for consumers, capital, or 
the powers that be, but also and more severely for the people that are forced 
to live on the streets of our cities. What are the alternatives? Perhaps we 
should look at the central political outlook of modern Western states: liberal-
ism and respect for autonomy and agency.
2. The Liberal Approach to Homelessness
There are roughly two versions of the liberal approach to homelessness, 
namely, a minimalist version (§ 2.1) and what I think is appropriate to refer 
to as a generous version (§ 2.2). Neither of these variants, however, is mor-
ally convincing, although the latter comes much closer to this.
2.1. The Minimalist Variant of the Liberal Approach
Jeremy Waldron represents the minimalist liberal approach to the scandal of 
first world homelessness, and a fairly influential one.28 Waldron argues that 
liberalism well understood would reject an interpretation of private property 
or common property that would make the exercise of certain basic freedoms 
that are tied to certain basic needs—such as sleeping, finding food, urinat-
ing—effectively impossible. Freedom means that everyone is allowed to 
exercise such freedoms, including homeless persons, and that implies having 
a space to do that.
Now although Waldron stresses that the exercise of freedoms one way or 
another involves space, and that a conception of property that limits such 
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space for a certain group of people is illegitimate, he is not thinking of a pri-
vate home for the homeless. He argues that we need a conception of public 
space that is not at odds with such spaces to exercise these basic needs.
Hence there are no serious proposals to house the homeless, to provide 
them with what they need most, namely, a place where they can feel at home 
and that provides a sense of safety and privacy as well as protection from the 
cold and from danger. Waldron puts it as follows:
Now one question we face as a society—a broad question of justice and social 
policy—is whether we are willing to tolerate an economic system in which 
large numbers of people are homeless. Since the answer is evidently “Yes,” the 
question that remains is whether we are willing to allow those who are in this 
predicament to act as free agents, looking after their own needs, in public 
spaces—the only space available to them.29
Waldron argues that we ought to answer “Yes” to the second question as 
well. This position could be construed as a type of non-ideal theory that 
argues against an increasingly hostile political and juridical system for the 
homeless in many urban centers that makes it effectively impossible for them 
to engage in life-sustaining activities.30 That is why he refers to his argument 
as a case of “negative freedom.”31
Now if the homeless had to choose between Waldron’s version of liberal 
freedom and the current reality of being chased from one city to the next, the 
choice would be straightforward. In that sense, Waldron argues for a more 
accommodating public space for the homeless, “who must live their whole 
lives on common land.”32 Yet I believe that this position is not ambitious 
enough and, furthermore, is based on a false opposition. The options we are 
presented with here are the following.
The first option is to accept this economic system and the prosperity that 
it has brought for most of “us,” but take as a given the fact that there is some 
unavoidable collateral damage in the form of those who, for some reason, 
cannot keep up, and fall through the cracks of the system. For them, we 
should firmly reject the punitive approach given that people simply need 
some space to perform essential “activities” like “urinating, washing, sleep-
ing, cooking, eating, and standing around.”33 Furthermore, we can make life 
better by a “generous provision of public lavatories,” which would already 
make “an immense difference.”34
These are stop-gap measures of course, not substantive solutions. Even 
though the homeless are an uncomfortable “reminder of the human price that 
is paid for a social structure”35 like the one we live in, we should apparently 
grow up and get used to the sight of the homeless. And if it can be a comfort, 
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Waldron has not stopped respecting the homeless as “agents”: “Perhaps the 
strongest argument for thinking about the homeless as an issue of freedom is 
that it forces us to see people in need as agents.”36 At least they have the 
freedom now to urinate and sleep in public.
The second option is not really explored, although some references to 
“communism” suggest that this politico-economic system might be better for 
the homeless, but cannot be considered to be a real alternative.37 The false 
opposition that Waldron works with here—either we accept the homeless and 
protect their negative freedom to perform essential human activities or we 
reject the liberal-democratic state based on a free market—is a premise he 
shares with Marxist theorists like Peter Marcuse and others who argue in 
favor of the opposite horn of the false dilemma: “a large-scale, collective, 
mobilized effort to transform the social, economic, and ideological underpin-
nings of the current systemic conditions.”38
The problem of homelessness in liberal welfare states calls for neither a 
complete political and economical transformation nor a laissez-faire liberal 
approach that is accompanied by the cold consolation of at least being taken 
seriously as “agents.” I fail to see why this type of recognition is so crucial 
that it gets in the way of more significant types of help and care, which we 
will discuss in the next section. What the stress on agency seems to miss is 
the fact that most homeless persons are on the streets not because they want 
to be, because this is part of some plan of life that we liberals have to 
“respect.” Respecting people is categorical and not conditional, but some-
times for those in dire need, for those that are sleeping rough, without a home 
and sufficient food and shelter we have to consider if other types of recogni-
tion should not be considered in addition to respect. But before we do that, let 
us see if liberal autonomy can be interpreted in another, more generous, way 
in relation to the fate of the homeless.
2.2. The Generous Variant of the Liberal Approach
Some theorists like Schrader argue that our homes “constitute for each of us 
a unique domain of personal autonomy.”39 Having a home implies the right to 
exclude those who are not part of the household. This realm of protection has 
even been extended by law to the legal tenant.40 Unless there are special cir-
cumstances that permit government agencies to enter with special warrants, 
no person beyond the small circle of immediate family is entitled to enter our 
home without our permission. In that sense our home is a bastion of auton-
omy and to lack a home, it can be argued, is a fundamental violation of basic 
liberal respect.
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This argument can be enriched by adding the dimension of privacy. Karin-
Frank argues that privacy is needed for the development of an intact sense of 
self, for the cultivation of a sense of identity and intimacy.41 A home can be 
seen as the physical component for achieving a state of privacy. A home pro-
vides a space where primary relationships can develop and flourish. In addi-
tion, privacy means that one is able to withdraw from the demands and 
stresses of public life and the public roles that we play, that we can temporar-
ily be “off stage.”42
This more generous interpretation of liberalism leads to a very different 
conclusion than Waldron’s version; homeless people have a right to a home 
and that is what should be underscored instead of the right to dwell in public. 
Although there is much to be said for this more demanding liberal approach 
to homelessness, and although in some ways it overlaps with the care 
approach that I will defend later, there are two shortcomings to it that, I think, 
undermine its initial normative force.
A first reservation I have is that homeless people in many cases need more 
than simply the right to be left alone, which the right to exclude and the right 
to privacy basically boil down to. Citizens who have become homeless often 
have specific needs that are related to the fact that they have become home-
less in the first place—substance abuse, mental health problems, trauma, to 
name a few—that have to be addressed. In addition to that, transitions out of 
homelessness often require a myriad of support concerning things like living 
and household skills, finance/income and positive social networks. A home 
surely is an important condition for that, but unfortunately in many cases it is 
not enough.43
Second, because liberalism essentially entails an anticipation of individual 
freedom and accountability, the question whether people have become home-
less as a result of their own irresponsible actions is either lurking in the back-
ground or it is an explicit part of the moral outlook. Although accountability 
is an important moral principle, it should not be conceived of as the pole star 
of moral reason. Homeless people in that case tend to appear as if their condi-
tion is either a free choice, a “life style,” or the consequence of reckless 
behavior for which they have to bear the costs themselves. Why should we 
provide them with homes, welfare provisions and care if their plight is the 
consequence of a series of free acts? Some US courts have even argued on 
this basis that the prohibition of sleeping or camping in public is entirely 
justified as well as the confiscation of possessions of homeless persons that 
are left in public places.44
For these reasons, the stress on liberal autonomy might not do the work 
that the generous interpretation of liberalism is after. This raises the ques-
tion whether an ethics of care could offer an alternative moral vision. An 
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ethics of care is focused not so much on “group difference” or “agency” but 
rather on providing the individualized care and help either to develop the 
needed independence and competences to function as an “agent” or to re-
constitute those competences and abilities (that for some tragic reason have 
been lost) as well as possible. The difference approach, focusing on recog-
nizing “social difference,” as well as the liberal approach that focuses on 
“agency” or the “right to exclude,” simply seem out of touch with the dire 
needs of the homeless. Before we focus on social difference or agency, we 
should focus on the needs of homeless people; needs that extend way 
beyond the need to be respected in one’s difference from others or to exer-
cise one’s individual autonomy.
3. The Care Approach to Homelessness
Key to Nel Noddings’s care approach to homelessness is that the focus is on 
the needs of those living on our streets instead of on their right to live and 
sleep there.45 She defends a demanding program of care that expresses a 
lively and justified resentment about the fact that there are co-citizens that 
have no place to go to except to homeless shelters that are often unsafe, dirty 
and that offer a temporary, overnight accommodation instead of a private 
home.46 According to Noddings, to not have a place that one can call one’s 
home is a violation of fundamental human needs and hence unacceptable. As 
she puts it: “The homeless need homes, not halfway measures that actually 
contribute to their continued homelessness.”47
First of all, there are practical reasons why people need a home. People 
need an address in order to be able to “register to vote, give appropriate infor-
mation on medical forms, receive the benefits to which they are entitled.”48 
And people need protection against the elements, against danger, a place to 
store one’s possessions, etc. But even if we would find ways around these 
practical issues, there are more fundamental needs at stake. There is a rela-
tionship between having an address, or rather having a home, a private place 
to live and dwell, and developing a sense of dignity and self-respect.49 Not 
being able to answer the question “Where do you live?” is accompanied by 
embarrassment, apology and humiliation. To be without an address is to live 
like an animal, to be reduced to one’s biological embodiment. Part of one’s 
identity is having a place one has made one’s own and that offers stability and 
a sense of security.50 The way I understand myself in a practical evaluative 
sense is related to the place where I live, the place that I have invested my 
time and my resources in, a place that offers a sense of intimacy and privacy, 
a place to receive visitors. Given these needs, Noddings argues that having a 
home should be construed as a right.51
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The kind of arrangements that can provide for these needs are probably 
multiple types. Noddings gives an example:
One can envision a building appointed for single men or women: small private 
bedrooms, a common dining hall, bathrooms conveniently located for each 
small block of bedrooms, a library/information center staffed by volunteers or 
by residents who have already acquired the requisite knowledge. No one would 
be forced to move out, but strong incentives would be provided for “moving 
on.” Everyone would do some kind of work to maintain the community. Some 
might work outside and pay a small rent until they could move into a situation 
more nearly self-supporting. Small apartments would also be provided for 
families, and childcare would also be available.52
Noddings does not shy away from certain forms of coercion. In fact she 
proposes three types of, what she considers, legitimate coercion:
1. First of all, we should coerce homeless persons to make use of such 
housing options: “a caring community is justified in saying, “You 
may not live on the streets.”53
2. Secondly, inhabitants (to the extent of their abilities) should work, 
either inside the home or via the job market in order to contribute and 
accept reciprocity.
3. The third level of coercion is needed when we are dealing with home-
less psychiatric patients. About one third of homeless adults suffer 
from a serious psychiatric illness, including schizophrenia and affec-
tive, personality, and character disorders.54 Mental illness is the third 
largest cause of homelessness for single adults.55 Given facts like 
these, Noddings argues that it is justified to coerce the severely men-
tally ill homeless into accepting some kind of treatment for their 
illness.56
To put these types of coercion into perspective: she argues that they should 
always be accompanied by a respect for the point of view and the arguments 
of the cared-for. We do not have to simply choose care over respect, but to 
combine the two by keeping care relations interactive and to remain open for 
negotiation.57
I believe that the care-perspective to homelessness is, generally speaking, 
the most morally appropriate. Care simply is the most relevant moral outlook 
regarding those in society that are deeply dependent on others for meeting 
their basic needs.58 That does not imply a rejection of liberal autonomy or, as 
some argue,59 that care is more fundamental generally than liberal justice. It 
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is however more fundamental when a subclass of citizens is concerned that 
for some reason are trapped in a situation of dependency, need and suffering. 
The point is to extend the liberal focus on autonomy with a care perspective 
in the case of co-citizens who are dependent and cannot be considered suffi-
ciently autonomous.
There are, I believe, different arguments for the moral relevance of care in 
the situation of homelessness. First, it makes sense to apply the moral logic 
of care given the fact that what homeless people need most is attention to 
their basic needs and well-being. One of those basic needs, of course, is a 
home. To instrumentalize this need in terms of a “precondition” or “resource” 
for “autonomy” is possible if one insists on a monistic liberal approach, but it 
seems to miss the inherent value and meaning a home has for a person. 
Furthermore, the focus on “needs” rather than on “agency” allows in princi-
ple for qualified types of coercion that might be warranted or even called for. 
Sometimes homeless individuals take decisions that not only perpetuate their 
inhuman condition but that are life threatening in a rather acute way, for 
instance, when they refuse to go to warm accommodation during periods of 
extreme cold.60 In this example, an intervention seems clearly called for, 
especially given the fact that many homeless suffer from psychiatric condi-
tions. However, I believe that Noddings does not succeed in justifying, or 
sufficiently qualifying, her three levels of coercion. I will get back to this in 
the next section, where I discuss some of the major challenges the care 
approach to homelessness faces.
A second element that characterizes care is attentiveness to the particular 
situation of a concrete individual.61 The fact that every human situation is 
unique by virtue of differences in the participants implies that the objective 
of care, the appropriate response to specific needs, “shifts with the situa-
tion.”62 Instead of an impartial focus on our common humanity, the so-called 
generalized other characterized by rationality and reason, and instead of 
“group difference” or shared “identity,” care is oriented towards the individ-
ual characteristics of a concrete context of care. Care ethics is characterized 
by receptivity to a particular set of needs and a specific affective-emotional 
constitution that can only be properly understood and responded to in the 
light of a person’s relational identity and history.63 And although care policy 
by definition is general, it needs to be instrumental in establishing the condi-
tions (practices, institutions) under which caring for particular individuals 
with concrete needs can take place. To be able to speak of a “politics of care” 
we need to make this basic distinction between on the one hand the face-to-
face meeting of particular needs of the cared-for—what Noddings refers to as 
“caring-for” and Tronto as “care-giving”—and on the other the institutional 
conditions that allow the necessary care work to take place.64
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Yet attentiveness and responsiveness to the individuality of the other is 
crucial given the fact that “the homeless” is a category that contains many 
different people with very different stories and backgrounds often in need of 
specialized, particular attention. In fact, the population of the homeless is so 
diverse, and routes to homelessness so different, that they seem to defy any 
categorization at all.65 For instance, a person that has lost his job, family sup-
port and eventually his house as a result of substance abuse needs more than 
just a roof above his head. He needs different types of support that address a 
range of needs.66 But someone who is homeless as a result of being dis-
charged from prison without any savings or support creates another set of 
challenges. Homeless with severe psychiatric conditions need yet another 
approach based on specialized treatment and care.67 It makes no sense to 
apply the idea of “distributive justice” here, by mechanically and bureaucrati-
cally supplying citizens with certain goods that they have a “right” to based 
on their “contribution” to a scheme of social cooperation, often perversely 
tied to the one thing the homeless do not have, namely, a private address. In 
fact, a major reason why the problem of homelessness is distinctive and unfit 
for a general theory of social rights is this sheer diversity of individuals with 
their particular problems, needs and chaotic living conditions.
A third characteristic that is significant here is that care, according to most 
theorists of care, takes relationships to be key to its provision.68 Of course, 
care in the family situation is by definition constituted by a web of relation-
ships characterized by emotional ties that make it possible to respond appro-
priately to certain expressed needs and feelings.69 The homeless are not 
always solitary—homeless families are part of the group of homeless—but 
often the homeless are socially isolated, either as a family or as a solitary 
person.70 In fact, an essential part of the psychological trauma of becoming 
homeless is that it typically is accompanied by a rapid disintegration of social 
networks.71
The care perspective needs to somehow establish the beginning of a new, 
reliable, caring social network. Care ethics has been criticized by liberal 
thinkers, such as Will Kymlicka, for depending on such a network and hence 
unable to offer care to those who are not yet part of a web of caring relation-
ships characterized by affective involvement.72 However, care can also refer 
to the attempt to establish or re-establish the beginning of such a network, 
especially if we are not dealing with “distant strangers” but with people that 
are at least spatially close. As McNaughton argues on the basis of twenty-
eight biographical case studies, the transition out of homelessness can only 
really take place by reconnecting with positive social networks. And it is this 
transition in which support workers can play a mediating role.73
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In many cases, the help that is provided for by professional care cannot 
directly bring significant others into the life of the homeless. But the point 
of this professional relation is to bring the homeless, step by step, back into 
a social world. So what needs to be achieved in helping the homeless is to 
re-establish a positive social network and to realize care within such a net-
work, most minimally by providing the homeless with a sense that someone 
is there for them. Furthermore, community housing like in the Noddings 
example, where privacy is combined with community, could be part of this 
approach. Mediation with family members can be helpful as well, provided 
that it is expected to contribute to a positive network for the person involved.
To the extent that “professionalism” is referring to objectivity and formal 
role playing by care workers, a certain amount of “deprofessionalism” might 
be necessary to provide for the needed informal and accommodating atmo-
sphere.74 This will, amongst others, require specialized training for those pro-
fessional caretakers that establish the first-contacts and that try to win the 
confidence of the homeless. Homeless people are often—excusez le mot—
un-appetizing and off-putting: they do not have washing machines, periodic 
dental care, or a closet with clean clothes. They often suffer from skin condi-
tions and other medical problems due to living on the streets for an extended 
period of time. Hence it will be demanding not simply to perceive someone 
as an obscene presence or passive object of medical attention, but instead, to 
act non-stigmatizing and in a way that is responsive to particular needs. A 
certain level of personal involvement seems necessary for this. Liberal 
impartiality and neutrality are inappropriate here: what we need is a sense of 
concern and sympathetic engagement with the individual as a person and his 
or her condition and background.
4. Care and Homelessness: Challenges and 
Opportunities
There is one central concern that needs to be addressed, a concern that pops up 
again and again in the literature, namely, that care, help, therapy and so on in 
the case of homelessness are really normalizing attempts to assimilate the 
“other” to what is considered to be standards of appropriate behavior and liv-
ing. Michel Foucault is looming large here.75 And not only is the care approach 
a kind of illegitimate exercise of unilateral and irreversible power in the name 
of the normal and the sane, but also does the attempt to provide the homeless 
with homes and not allow them to live on the streets lead to a kind of “legal 
limbo,” given that these ideals are doomed to fail leaving the homeless in effect 
nowhere to go.76 These are serious charges that should be taken seriously.
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A first thing to notice when we evaluate these complaints is that the criti-
cized care approach is often way less ambitious than the one we have dis-
cussed. The point is not simply to “shelter” the homeless and keep them “alive 
with a bed, a blanket and some soup,”77 but to work towards the provision of 
housing that offers a permanent, safe and secure home including the necessary 
care and support. Secondly, Foucault’s work has its merits as a critique of 
power asymmetries that are unilateral and fixed, the panopticon being the 
prime example.78 The care approach cannot, however, simply be identified 
with such irreversible and reifying power relations. Noddings for example 
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of taking the viewpoint of the cared-for 
seriously as well as trying to address their concerns. To simply reject care as an 
illegitimate attempt to assimilate the “other to the same,” to construe it by defi-
nition as a type of normalization that is insufficiently sensitive to the subjectiv-
ity of the cared-for, is not only a terribly stereotypical interpretation of care, it 
also seems to be based on the wrongheaded premise that care excludes respect. 
It seems to be based on the idea that either one recognizes the equal moral sta-
tus and moral accountability of the homeless, or one engages in a politics of 
care that construes the homeless as passive, helpless, pathological victims.
Care for needs and respect for autonomy are not mutually exclusive prin-
ciples: in fact, care ought to be accompanied by respect and should aim at a 
recovery of a certain threshold of competence in being self-governing. Yet 
tensions between these principles can arise, for instance, when someone’s 
own vision of her good is overruled in the name of care for what other people 
think are her “real needs.” Hence, what should be central to the principles that 
govern the way we organize our political and social institutions in general, 
other things being equal, is the importance of the ability to live one’s life 
according to one’s own ideas of the good and to have the freedom to re-
evaluate these ideas.79 Individuals vary considerably regarding their ideas of 
what makes a life meaningful and they themselves are almost always better 
positioned to know what it is that adds value to their own lives.80 This moral 
vision is best expressed in liberal theory and liberal practice and is backed up 
by publicly recognized rights and entitlements that are well entrenched in 
most liberal-democratic societies. That is why I’m not arguing for a politics 
of care tout court, but for a focused care politics, namely, for those in society, 
like the homeless, that are dependent and in great need, either temporarily81 
or more systematically.
We should acknowledge, however, that the care approach even in this spe-
cific interpretation is vulnerable to being exploited on three levels. The first 
way it could be misused is by political actors that only pay lip service to 
“compassion” and “care” for the plight of the homeless, while exclusively 
engaging in a politics of displacement and criminalization. Hence, to put this 
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risk in a formula: coercion yes, care no. This would simply chase the home-
less from one neighborhood to the next and force them into warehouse-like 
shelters even though these are often in short supply.82
A second type of possible misuse comes from the subjects of care them-
selves. Why would someone who is offered cheap accommodation in the 
housing project as well as food and services for their personal problems, 
eventually, feel the need to “move on”? Perhaps this life is too easy to be 
motivated to become self-supporting again. This is a well-known complaint 
concerning the provisions of the welfare state in general: don’t these provi-
sions make people dependent and passive instead of providing sufficient 
incentives to become independent, contributing citizens again, thereby 
regaining a sense of self-esteem?
The third risk of misuse is tied to the three levels of coercion that Noddings 
argues for as part of the care approach to homelessness, namely: (1) not 
allowing homeless dwelling, (2) forcing inhabitants of supportive housing to 
work and contribute, and (3) forcing medical treatment on psychiatric 
patients. Perhaps some care workers and institutions offer care without 
respect, leaving the homeless at the receiving end of a whole panopticon of 
therapeutic power. Care can deteriorate into a practice of forcefully taking 
“beggars” from the streets and putting them into “care institutions” that oper-
ate on the basis of unchecked and arbitrary use of power, so vividly and dis-
turbingly embodied by nurse Ratched in the famous book and film One Flew 
over the Cuckoo’s Nest.
Concerning the first type of misuse: it would be cynical to argue against 
the ambitious care approach to homelessness by claiming that authorities 
might take advantage of the system. You would be saying to the homeless: 
“I cannot do more for you than allow you to live on the streets, for there are 
some bad politicians out there who might take advantage of our ideals to 
make your life better.” We should first of all raise the logic of care for the 
homeless to the level of national legislation and, second, we should hold 
public authorities accountable who refuse to abide by the law, as we do in 
other cases where public rules and regulations are violated.
These rules, however, should be democratically supported. So a public 
and political debate is needed in order to convince the public of the inhuman 
condition of the homeless and that the care approach offers a better life. This, 
however, could be quite a challenge given how dominant liberal culture is 
with its stress on the importance of self-reliance and personal accountability, 
particularly in countries like the United States where a more classical liberal-
ism is still hegemonic. But for those citizens or officials who are not con-
vinced by the moral argument of care for the homeless, one could present two 
cost–benefit arguments in favor of the care model.
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First, this approach would ultimately put an end to the homeless sleeping, 
begging and urinating on the streets that now takes place, often in socially 
dense areas such as downtown shopping streets and city parks. The homeless 
undeniably cause a certain level of inconvenience to the wider public.
Secondly, liberal thinkers sometimes worry that “providing a home by the 
state is an economic burden,”83 but in fact the costs of homelessness are much 
higher. Recently the Canadian Homelessness Research Network estimated 
the annual costs of homelessness to the Canadian economy to be a whopping 
7.05 billion Canadian dollars. As the authors say: “Homelessness is expen-
sive because we cycle people through expensive public systems and increas-
ingly costly and uncoordinated emergency services systems.” A focus on 
permanent solutions provides “the opportunity to reduce the long-term cost 
of homelessness and make more efficient and effective use of public 
resources.”84 Hence for those who worry about the feasibility of a generous 
provision of housing for the homeless, we may take the success of the recent 
“housing first approach” as an indication that liberal governments are sensi-
tive to this cost-effectiveness. Housing first provides immediate access to 
permanent and secure housing with no housing readiness requirements and 
offers a system of support and care. This new approach to homelessness is 
increasingly practiced both in Europe, the United States and Canada, and is 
considered a paradigm shift from the traditional staircase type service model, 
where homeless people would go through step-by-step progression of ser-
vices that included treatment and that ended with permanent housing if and 
only if the “clients” would meet the requirements of the different steps of the 
program. Housing first has proved to be much more successful in preventing 
people from becoming homeless again.85
How to assess the second hazard, namely, regarding homeless individuals 
passively giving themselves over to a temptingly comfortable way of life in 
the supportive home? Noddings herself seems aware of this risk, although it 
is not very prominently addressed. Firstly, she does argue in favor of types of 
“work fare” in order to regain a sense of self-respect and to instill a sense of 
reciprocity as well as to make life in the supportive housing situation not a 
kind of holiday resort.86 Secondly, people under care are never “forced to 
move out, but strong incentives would be provided for ‘moving on.’”87 What 
these “strong incentives” could be, however, remains utterly unclear.
In the case that residents have become self-sufficient again,88 the heavily 
subsidized living conditions of supportive housing have become unnecessary 
and could instill a state of dependency, which is always a risk of caring.89 
Even the regular homeless shelter system, according to some homelessness 
experts, attracts “poor people who wouldn’t otherwise be homeless . . . as a 
way of quickly tapping into government assistance.”90 Hence, systems of 
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review and control need to be in place in order to establish if a person is able 
to “move on.” And if so, there should be certain incentives in place that 
“encourage” someone to do so, for instance, by losing certain privileges. 
Checks should be institutionalized that guarantee that care is always oriented 
towards a recovery, or at least an optimalization of independence and indi-
vidual accountability. That is the true meaning of a care approach that takes 
respect seriously. But at the same time it is no more than realistic to admit that 
any system of care is liable to misuse by free riders. That is a kind of collat-
eral damage that is better to account for, however, than the collateral damage 
that is inflicted upon a substantial number of our co-citizens, namely, those 
living on the streets, as a result of a rage to reduce our plural moral universe 
to one and one value only: personal autonomy and individual responsibility.
The third kind of misuse that the care-approach is liable to is power abuse, 
given that care sometimes calls for coercive interventions. Noddings’s three 
levels of coercion could at each stage be abused: (ad. 1) taking people off the 
streets against their will could easily degenerate into a kind of Rudi Giuliani, 
zero-tolerance street sweeps and practices like the burning of possessions of 
the homeless; (ad. 2) forcing people to work, inside or outside the home, runs 
the risk of adding insult to injury in those cases where that type of activity 
cannot be expected; (ad. 3) finally, coercing people into treatment of mental 
illnesses in their “best interests” could derail into practices of forcefully 
administering mind altering drugs (or perhaps even brain surgery) in order to 
create the desired “docile bodies.”
A general answer to these risks is that the review systems I have referred 
to above, should not just check to what extent consumers take advantage of 
care, but they should also cover the care takers and their practices in order to 
avoid power misuse. But even with boards of review in place, the third kind 
of coercion remains unacceptable given the potentially far reaching nature of 
the intervention. To engage in treatment of mental conditions without coop-
eration of the person involved is prone to violations of basic respect for the 
physical and psychological integrity of the person, even if we assume that 
such forced treatment of psychiatric patients can ever be effective. Such coer-
cion can only be justified if there is an acute risk of serious harm to self or 
others. Being homeless could qualify as “causing harm” to the self, however, 
given the risks forced psychiatric treatment brings—power abuse, therapeu-
tic ignorance, and insufficient controls and review systems for those who 
want to normalize instead of cure—the case Noddings makes to justify coer-
cion here utterly fails. That does not mean that caretakers, psychiatrists and 
therapists should not try to convince the mentally ill concerning diagnosis 
and appropriate medical response, but if persuasion fails coercion is not 
acceptable.
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Concerning the first kind of coercion: although the current and quite suc-
cessful “housing first” approach is very much in line with a care philosophy, 
there is one important difference and that is the central place of “consumer 
choice” within the housing first model.91 The logic of care allows for certain 
forms of coercion if need be, most importantly regarding the “choice” to live 
on the street. Another paper would be required to access carefully how this 
type of paternalistic coercion should be qualified, legitimized and limited.92 
Noddings’s version of paternalism is rather crude. Very generally, some qual-
ifications are important in this regard. Firstly, if the homelessness in case is 
really of the voluntary type that we have discussed earlier, small as this group 
may be, forced intervention is hard to legitimize for the reason that this would 
amount to a violation of the liberal principle of self-determination. In most 
cases, however, homelessness is not voluntary and if the housing alternatives 
meet certain basic interests such as privacy and self-respect, most homeless 
will gladly accept these. Secondly, paternalistic intervention against expressed 
wishes of someone to remain on the street seems particularly justified if the 
homeless person is a psychiatric patient who is severely estranged from his or 
her own powers of reason and judgment, for instance, in the case of severe 
schizophrenia or a major depression. Mental incapacitation is typically seen 
as a good reason to act on behalf of someone for her own good when basic 
interests are at stake—what Feinberg refers to as soft paternalism.93 Such 
policies of coercion should however remain firmly within a care perspective 
instead of a criminal justice or policing perspective that prosecutes and pun-
ishes. Thirdly, the care offered should always remain dialogic and open to 
negotiation, instead of becoming a self-righteous construal of the homeless as 
passive objects of care. This could for example mean that housing the home-
less ought to take preferred locations of the homeless into account, although 
these preferences have to be balanced against financial and organizational 
feasibility.
5. Conclusion
If a homeless person asks you for a bit of change, so the joke goes, you should 
answer: “change comes from within.” That, of course, is not the change a 
homeless person refers to. But let us suppose that the homeless living on the 
streets of our cities do in fact ask for change in that other, more profound 
sense. Let us suppose that they do ask for more than a bit of money, some 
legal and social tolerance and public toilets. Given the condition they are in it 
seems wrongheaded to suppose that all they need is a bit of will power.
The liberal idea that autonomy is the beginning and the end of our moral 
concerns runs the risk of leaving the homeless where they are, either because 
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it suggests that they are there on a voluntary basis or because they deserve to 
suffer the consequences of their own irresponsible behavior. To conceive of 
the condition of homelessness in terms of a type of difference that we have to 
respect and accommodate, is missing the point of their condition as well. 
Homelessness is not a part of the urban landscape that needs to be recognized 
on a par with ethno-cultural difference in the name of a respect for diversity 
and pluralism. It is good and well to argue for a wide range of acceptable 
social diversity, but some types of difference fall outside of the range.
Housing should be considered a right and a caring society has a duty to 
keep its citizens from living on the streets, especially if we are dealing with 
countries that have the ability to do so given their existing levels of affluence. 
This means first and foremost making available the required resources to 
house the homeless in ways that meet their basic interests. Furthermore, an 
affluent society should not just deal with the homeless that live on the streets 
already but also invest in the long-term prevention of new cases of homeless-
ness occurring. Here the availability of affordable housing ought to figure 
prominently. Although it will never be able on its own to eradicate homeless-
ness, for the reason that this is a multi-causational problem with both a host 
of structural as well as possible individual triggers, most theorists agree that 
affordable housing is key to prevention.94 Affordability is a function both of 
income and housing costs and so both dimensions should be taken into 
account. On the income side we can think of measures like sufficient mini-
mum wage, robust systems of social security, reducing taxes for those at the 
bottom of the income distribution, while on the housing side we can think of 
policies like rent control and social housing, protecting single room occu-
pancy housing and laws that require developers to build affordable housing 
whenever they are granted rights to build luxury or commercial facilities.95 
These types of policies and measures are basically part and parcel of the way 
essential goods are fairly distributed across all members of a society, in which 
issues of fairness and solidarity play a key role. I do not think that care-ethics 
has anything special to offer here as these questions can be dealt with effec-
tively from the point of view of a theory and politics of social justice that is 
universal in scope instead of focused on individual needs and situations of 
extreme dependency.
Important as these measures may be, the limitation of long-term structural 
prevention is that it does nothing to alleviate the suffering of those individu-
als and families living on our streets here and now. Furthermore, it is highly 
unlikely that homelessness can be eradicated by structural measures only. 
This article has focused on the homeless individuals and families themselves 
not because prevention is unimportant but because there are people out there 
that need attention, care and recourses right now. And to have a home is not 
van Leeuwen 605
something that should be made conditional on sanity, sobriety, money, or 
cooperation with treatment and therapy. Nor should people be allowed to fall 
to a level of “bare life” on the basis of imprudent and unwise decisions in the 
past. Nobody deserves to live in the streets and public parks or sleep in emer-
gency shelters. Change sometimes does not come from “within” and so the 
plight of the homeless calls for practices, attitudes and institutions that offer 
help and care. If there really is a risk involved here in terms of the possibili-
ties of misuse that we have discussed, this is a risk worth taking.
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